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allow the buyer's amortization of the allocation to the restrictive covenant.
The court made reference to this when it stated that "where a loss of tax rev-
enues from one taxpayer cannot be retrieved entirely from another because
of differentials in tax brackets or other factors the Commissioner may chal-
lenge the allocation as not reflecting the substance of the transaction." 22 It
would seem that this ought to be the only situation in which the Commissioner
can attack an allocation in a contract for sale of a business. If the amount of
taxes that will be collected from both parties when their contract is cast in
economically unreal form is not less than the amount that would have been
collected if the contract were cast in an economically real form, there is no
reason for the Commissioner to deny a taxpayer the tax benefits of the eco-
nomically unreal form. If the Commissioner were to deprive him of these ben-
efits and at the same time require the other party to the contract to bear the
tax burdens of the unrealistic form, then the Commissioner would be collecting
more taxes than he would have collected if the contract had been cast in a
form which had economic reality. Therefore, to prevent such a result, a rule
that the Commissioner can disregard the form of a taxpayer's contract only
when the taxpayer's tax savings are greater than the increased taxes assessed
upon the other party to the contract is a necessary complement to the court's
rule in Danielson.
GERALD J. HOENIG
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B)
—Limitations on Product Picketing.—Honoluizt Typographical Union
No. 37. 1—Hawaii Press Newspaper, Inc. publishes a group of newspapers,
one of which is the Waikiki Beach Press. Since June, 1963, a labor dispute
involving a strike and picketing has existed between Hawaii Press and the
Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37. At least six shops in the International
Market Place, a privately owned shopping center consisting of fifty to sixty
shops, are regular advertisers in the Waikiki Beach Press. On three 'separate
dates, the Union in support of its dispute with Hawaii Press picketed and dis-
tributed handbills to the public at the entrance to the shopping center. Each
of the pickets carried a placard identifying one of the five shops located in
the Market Place. The placard stated that the named shop advertised in the
struck Waikiki Beach Press and requested the public not to buy any of the
shop's products advertised in the Press. Four of these five shops were restau-
rants which advertised their entire business, rather than a particular product..
Hawaii Press charged that this picketing was a violation of Section 8 (b) (4)-
(ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act.= The National Labor Relations
Board HELD: (4-1) Picketing by a striking newspaper union of a service
establishment which advertises its whole business in the struck newspaper is
not allowable secondary activity under section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) .3
22 378 F.2d at 778.
1 167 N.L.R.B. Nci. 150, 66 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1967).
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (ii) (B) (1964).
3 167 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 3, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1195.
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In evaluating and analyzing the rationale and effect of the Board's de-
cision it is necessary to consider the applicable statute, section 8(b) (4)-
(ii) (B), the publicity proviso thereto .' and the judicial interpretation of the
statute.° In relevant part, the statute provides that:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
(4) ... (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where
in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
handling, transporting, , or otherwise dealing in the products of
any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease do-
ing business with any other person ... .
. . . Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph
(4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed
to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truth-
fully advising the public ... that a product or products are produced
by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer ....°
The 1959 Amendments to the Labor Management Relations Act, of which
this section is a part, were designed to close loopholes which had developed in
the application of Section 8(b) (4) of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 . 7 The
1947 legislation was intended to prohibit secondary picketing, but subse-
quent interpretations enabled unions to engage in a wide range of secondary
activities.° Congress amended section 8(b) (4) to extend the statute's applica-
tion to prohibit union pressure imposed directly on the secondary employer.°
The amended statute was extensively examined and interpreted by the
SUpreme Court in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 76010 (here-
inafter Tree Fruits). In Tree Fruits, the union called a strike against the
Fruit Packers and Warehousemen who distributed apples to a supermarket
chain. The union, in the course of its primary dispute with the Fruit Packers,
instituted a consumer boycott in support of its strike. It picketed the customer
entrances at each of the stores operated by the chain. The pickets, usually
two in number, wore placards and distributed handbills to the supermarket's
customers and to the general public. The union urged the public to refrain
from buying the apples produced by the struck employer. Apples handled by
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964).
5 NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) ; NLRB v.
Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964) ; Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d
434, 61 L.R.R.M. 2364 (9th Cir. 1966).
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
7 NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 51 (1964).
8 See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 64 (1964).
9 See NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 53-54 (1964).
to 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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the struck employer constituted only a small part of the business of the
supermarket chain, since it was only one of the many products handled by the
chain.
The issue presented to the Court was whether picketing of a secondary
employer urging that employer's customers to refrain from purchasing the
product of the employer with whom the union has a labor dispute is a viola-
tion of section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B).' 1 The Court held that secondary picketing of
retail outlets limited to persuading the public to refrain from purchasing the
product of a primary employer is not the type of secondary picketing con-
demned by section 8(b) (4), even if the picketing caused a reduction in the
secondary employer's sales of the primary employer's product.' 2 Emphasizing
congressional intent in enacting the 1959 amendments and alluding to possible
constitutional infirmities flowing from a broad ban on peaceful picketing,' 3
the Court refused to conclude that all peaceful picketing at the secondary
situs was proscribed. Instead, the Court found that the "specific end" against
which Congress legislated in 1959 was the use of picketing, peaceful or other-
wise, to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease all deal-
ings with it in order to force the secondary employer to stop dealing with the
primary employer.'"
The Court then distinguished picketing intended to shut off all trade with
the secondary employer from picketing which is directed against only the
products of the primary employer which are sold at the secondary situs. While
the former type of picketing was prohibited because it attempts to secure
the secondary employer's cooperation in the union's dispute with the primary
employer, the picketing of the product of the primary employer at the
secondary situs was allowed because the union's appeal to the public is
confined to its dispute with the primary employer. This latter type of
secondary consumer appeal was considered to be a form of direct action
against the primary employer, similar in purpose and effect to consumer
picketing which could legally be conducted at the primary employer's own
business situs since it seeks only to reduce the public's purchases of the struck
product, not the business of the secondary employer generally.' 5
In light of section 8(b) (4) and the peaceful consumer picketing excep-
tion thereto delineated in the Tree Fruits decision, the Board in the Honolulu
Typographical Union case was confronted with the issue whether the con-
sumer-picketing privilege of Tree Fruits protects picketing at the situs of a
secondary employer which utilizes the advertising services of a primary em-
ployer, where the picketing requests the public to refrain from purchasing
the products advertised and those products comprise the entire business of
11 Id. at 59.
12 Id. at 72.
13 The Tree Fruits Court balanced the Government's right to regulate labor rela-
tions with the union's right to engage in picketing, a form of free speech explicitly pro-
tected by the guarantees of the first amendment. Apparently, the Court recognized that
if the union's right to picket is a protected form of speech, any regulation thereof should
be only for an overriding public purpose, such as the prevention of violence in a labor
dispute. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-05 (1940).
14 377 U.S. at 70-72 (1964).
12 Id. at 72.
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the secondary employer. In holding that such picketing is not protected
consumer picketing but rather a violation of section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B), the
Board had to interpret the Tree Fruits distinction between prohibited sec-
ondary picketing which seeks to persuade customers of the secondary employer
to cease trading with him in order to coerce him to stop dealing with the
primary employer, and allowable consumer picketing which is aimed solely
at the products of the primary employer being sold at a secondary situs 1 0
On the facts of the instant case involving a secondary employer which sold
only one item, its culinary services, and which advertised that one item in the
struck newspaper, a majority of the Board felt that picketing requesting the
public to refrain from patronizing the restaurant was a total consumer boycott
of the secondary employer designed to coerce it to cease utilizing the adver-
tising services of the primary employer.
The majority then considered whether picketing which urges the cus-
tomers of the secondary employer to refrain completely from dealing with
it is protected by the publicity proviso to section 8 (b) (4). The Board
refused to hold that the activity is protected by the proviso, relying on the
following language in Tree Fruits:
The proviso indicates no more than that the Senate conferees' consti-
tutional doubts led Congress to authorize publicity other than picket-
ing which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop
all trading with him On the other hand, picketing which per-
suades the customers of the secondary employer to stop all trading
with him was.... to be barred. 17
The Labor Board concluded that the right to handbill at the secondary situs
and the right to picket at the secondary situs are not equivalent and synono-
mous. On the contrary, while the union may urge the public by handbill to
cease all dealings with the secondary employer, it cannot do so by picketing.
Therefore, secondary consumer picketing must not be evaluated in terms of
the publicity proviso, but rather in terms of whether it imposes the type of
pressure on the secondary employer that Congress intended to prohibit."
Dissenting Member Jenkins, however, was of the opinion that the picket-
ing herein involved should have been allowed." To understand fully the
rationale and effect of his opinion it is necessary to consider NLRB v. Ser-
vette, Inc. 20 and Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB,21 which he
relied on as supporting, if not requiring, this conclusion. In Servette, the union
struck Servette, Inc., an independent wholesale distributor of specialty mer-
chandise sold by retail food chains. In support of its primary dispute the
union distributed handbills at the retail outlets which refused to discontinue
Servette's line of goods. The handbills urged customers not to buy certain
named items distributed by Servette and sold by the retailers. The lower
16 167 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 2-3, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1195.
17 377 U.S. at 70-71 (1964).
18 167 N.L.R.B. No. 150, at 5, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1196.
19 Id. at 9, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1197 (dissenting Opinion).
20 377 U.S. 46 (1964).
21 356 F.2d 434, 61 L.R.R.M. 2364 (9th Cir. 1966).
795
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
court held that since Servette was not directly involved in the physical process
of creating the products it was not a "producer" and hence the publicity
proviso did not apply to protect the handbilling.22 The Supreme Court re-
jected this narrow construction of the word "producer" and accepted instead
a prior Board determination that "products produced by an employer" in-
cluded products distributed by a wholesaler with whom the union has a
primary dispute. Consequently, the wholesaler-distributor is a producer of the
products distributed within the meaning of the statute. The Court went on to
conclude that "[t] here is nothing in the legislative history which suggests
that the protection of the proviso was intended to be any narrower in cover-
age than the prohibition to which it is an exception ...." 23 The Servette de-
cision was the first judicial step toward a holding that the supplier of a service
may be a "producer" within the meaning of that word in the LMRA. Since
the instant case involves not one, but two service establishments—the restau-
rant and the newspaper—the dissent must bring them within the coverage
of the statute before it concludes that their activity is allowable thereunder.
Furthermore, if the Tree Fruits rationale is to be applicable the secondary
employer must be involved in some way with a product of the primary em-
ployer. Great Western adds some interpretation to the Supreme Court's state-
ments in Servette.
The Great Western case involved a labor dispute between a union and a
television station. In the course of this dispute the union utilized consumer
appeals that were virtually identical to those in the instant case, both in nature
and content, except that their medium was handbilling rather than picketing.
In the first Great Western decision,24 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the Labor Board's decision that the handbilling was protected by the
publicity proviso. The Board had reasoned that the advertising service of the
television station standing alone was not the "product" within the meaning of
the publicity proviso, but rather the item being advertised by the station. The
television station was to be one of the producers of the items advertised be-
cause it added its labor in form of capital, enterprise and service to such
items.25 The court of appeals rejected this broad interpretation of the pub-
licity proviso, reasoning that the television advertising service, standing alone,
was not a "product" within the meaning of the publicity proviso since the only
products referred to by the proviso must be capable of being "distributed"
by another employer, and the advertising service rendered by a television
station was not capable of being so distributed, least of all by an employer
whose only relationship with the station is that of an advertiser 2 6
 Further, the
court explicitly rejected the Board's broad view of the term "producer" and
held that "producer" refers to one who deals with tangible items, one who is
engaged in a physical creative activity, that is, one directly involved in the
22 Servette, Inc. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 659, 51 L.R.R.M. 2621 (9th Cir. 1962).
23 377 U.S. at 55 (1964).
24 Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591, 51 L.R.R.M. 2480
(9th Cir. 1962).
26 AFTRA, San Francisco Local, 134 N.L.R.B. 1617, 49 L.R.R.M: 1391 (1961).
26 Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591, 596-97, 51 L.R.R.M.
2480, 2482-83 (9th Cir. 1962).
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physical process of creating the products, not one who advertises the product. 27
Following remand by the court, the Board again dismissed the complaint on
the ground that the union's conduct was protected by the publicity pro-
viso.28 The Board did so on the basis of its conclusion that the Supreme
Court, in Tree Fruits and Servette, had rejected the court's interpretation of
the statute and confirmed the Board's reading of the proviso. 29 The court was
faced with a determination of the same issues when this Board decision was
appealed, but with the additional guidelines afforded by Tree Fruits and
Servette.
Relying on the broad reading of the statute rendered by the Court in
Servette, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals felt itself constrained to hold,
despite its prior contrary opinion, that a television station which advertises
tangible items manufactured by another is a "producer" of the advertised
products." The court also held that an advertiser is a "producer" of services
which it advertises as well. On the basis of his analysis of Servette, Great
Western and Tree Fruits, dissenting Member Jenkins concluded the consumer
picketing in the instant case was allowable. He reasoned that these decisions
established two fundamental principles: first, a supplier of advertising services
participates in the production of the goods and services which it advertises
and thus, such a supplier is a "producer" of those goods and services within
the meaning of the publicity proviso; second, peaceful consumer picketing to
persuade the public to refrain from purchasing the products of a struck
primary employer is allowable at the situs of the secondary employer. Synthe-
sizing these principles, Member Jenkins concluded that if the secondary em-
ployer advertises all of its goods and services, the supplier of the advertising
service is a "producer" of all those goods and services. Consequently, peace-
ful consumer picketing by the employees of the primary employer at the situs
of the secondary employer urging the public to refrain from purchasing any
of the advertised goods and services should be allowed because it is merely
product picketing of the Tree Fruits variety. Thus, a union in the course of a
labor dispute with a supplier of advertising services, here a newspaper, could
lawfully picket all the goods and services of a secondary employer advertised
by the service, even if this would have the effect of initiating a total consumer
boycott of the secondary employer.
The importance of the Honolulu Typographical Union decision lies in
the fact that the majority opinion appears to impose a limitation on the
scope of the allowable secondary consumer product picketing by not extend-
ing this privilege to a case where the struck and picketed product comprises
the entire business of the secondary employer, rather than a minute portion,
a single product sold by a multiproduct secondary employer, as in Tree
Fruits. This limitation on the privilege of consumer product picketing is sup-
ported by the legislative history of the LMRA, the Board's construction of
27 Id. at 598, 51 L.R.R.M. at 2483.
28 150 N.L.R.B. 467, 58 L.R.R.M. 1019 (1964).
29 Id. at 470-71, 58 L.R.R.M. at 1021.
32 Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 434, 436, 61 L.R.R.M.
2364, 2365 (9th Cir. 1966).
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section 8(6)(4) and the publicity proviso prior to the Tree Fruits decision,
and perhaps more importantly, by a consideration of Tree Fruits itself.
Despite the apparently strained interpretation of the legislative history
of the statute rendered by the Court in Tree Fruits it is evident that the
Congress was directly concerned with the specific problem of secondary union
activity. Senator Kennedy in his statement of the purpose of the proviso said
that the proviso preserved
the right to appeal to consumers by methods other than picketing
asking them to refrain from buying goods . . . and to refrain from
trading with a retailer who sells such goods.... We were not able to
persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of that
secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree that the
union shall be free to conduct informational activity short of picket-
ing. In other words, the union can hand out handbills at the shop
... and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picket-
ing ....31
This would seem to indicate that the statute was intended at least to limit
some, if not all, forms of consumer picketing.
Further, the Board itself on numerous occasions construed section 8(b) (4)
as imposing an absolute ban on all types of secondary picketing, product or
otherwise. The Board reasoned that "by literal wording of the proviso [to sec-
tion 8(b) (4)] as well as through the interpretive gloss placed thereon by its
drafters, consumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment is pro-
hibited."32 Tree Fruits rejected this interpretation as imposing too broad a
ban on the union's right to publicize its dispute at a secondary situs. How-
ever, it is important to note that the Court only determined that peaceful
consumer product picketing was neither prohibited nor protected by the
publicity proviso; it failed to hold explicitly that consumer product picketing
was allowable in all circumstances. The Court emphasized that only publicity
which does not fall within that area of secondary consumer picketing which
Congress did prohibit under section 8(b) (4) is allowable. Thus it is clear that
some forms of consumer product picketing may still be prohibited by section
8(b)(4).
The determinative inquiry is a delineation of what precisely is to be in-
cluded within that area of secondary picketing which is so prohibited. The
prohibitions of section 8(b) (4) are keyed to the coercive nature of the union
conduct in its impact upon the neutral secondary employer." Activity which
constitutes a threat to, or a restraint upon the secondary employer aimed
at forcing it to cease dealing with the struck primary employer is specifically
prohibited." In Tree Fruits the Court said that consumer picketing aimed at
shutting off all trade with the secondary employer unless he aids the union
in its dispute with the primary employer is entirely different from picketing
31 105 Cong. Rec. 17, 898-99 (1959).
32 Upholsterers Frame & Bedding Workers Twin City Local No. 61, 132 N.L.R.B.
1172, 1177, 48 L.R.R.M. 1301, 1305 (1961).
33 NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 68 (1964).
34 Id. at 70-71.
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which only persuades his customers not to buy the struck product. 35 The
former is a secondary restraint and coercion which falls within the proscrip-
tions of section 8(b) (4) while the latter is protected. This distinction becomes
tenuous, however, if the picketed secondary employer depends largely or en-
tirely on sales of the struck product. Consider the difficulties presented if the
union appeal to customers in the form of picketing only requests that the pub-
lic refrain from purchasing the struck product, yet that struck product con-
stitutes the entire business of the secondary employer. If, for example, an
independent filling station owner sells petroleum products produced by Texaco,
would he feel less threatened, restrained, or coerced by picket signs which
proclaim, "Do not buy Texaco gasoline" than by placards which stated "Do
not patronize this station."? This would seem to be an appeal for a total con-
sumer boycott of the secondary employer which by its very nature would be
an attempt to pressure the secondary employer to cease dealing with the
primary employer. As such, this type of conduct would amount to secondary
restraint and coercion even though all that the union is ostensibly doing is
merely following the struck product. The probable coercive effect of the
product picketing would seem to be more likely where a single-product
secondary employer is involved, yet even in the case of a multiproduct sec-
ondary employer the probability of the picketing having a coercive effect seems
to be present because due to the
very nature of picketing there may be numbers of persons who will
refuse to buy at all from a picketed store, either out of economic or
social conviction or because they prefer to shop where they need not
brave a picket line. Moreover, the public can hardly be expected al-
ways to know or ascertain the precise scope of a particular picket-
ing operation. Thus in cases like this, the effect on the secondary em-
ployer may not always be limited to a decrease in his sales of the
struck product. And even when that is the effect, the employer may,
rather than simply reducing purchases from the primary employer,
deem it more expedient to turn to another producer whose product is
approved by the union."
The effects of picketing on a business were undoubtedly considered by
the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits before it decided that the neutral secondary
employer will have to endure some economic detriment in the intrests of an
effective national labor relations policy. The Tree Fruits result was no doubt
reached by a balancing of the detriments to the national policy and to the
secondary employer, with the balance in that case weighing in favor of the
policy considerations. When, however, a secondary employer will be severely
harmed by a policy allowing secondary activity, the balance of interests may
swing in favor of restricting the secondary activity of the labor unions. It must
be remembered that other forms of informational activity, such as handbill-
ing, are still available.
Despite the possible benefits of fair treatment for the secondary em-
ployer accruing from the picketing limitation imposed by the instant case,
35 Id.
56 Id. at 82-83 (dissenting opinion).
799
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the primary flaw in this decision is its failure clearly to draw the line between
allowable and prohibited product picketing and to delineate some standards
which would guide this determination in situations where the struck product
comprises less than all of the secondary employer's business. It would seem
that by allowing product picketing of a multiproduct secondary employer but
not of a single-product secondary employer that the standard for determining
the allowability of such product picketing is the nature of the secondary em-
ployer's business and the possible economic impact thereon. Still undetermined
by this decision is the situation where the union pickets products comprising
80 percent of the secondary employer's business. In such a case, the union is
not requesting customers to boycott the entire business, only 80 percent. Yet
the possible loss of 80 percent of one's business necessarily coerces the sec-
ondary employer to cooperate with the union and cease dealing with the
primary employer. Again even if the picketed products comprise 70 percent,
or 60 percent, or 50 percent of the secondary employer's business, the question
still remains: where to draw the line and on what basis. The present case
presents the first limitation on the Tree Fruits product-picketing privilege.
Only future Board and court opinions will determine the ultimate extent of
this privilege with the only apparent test being whether, in the context of
each case, the picketing is in the nature of secondary restraint and coercion.
PETER A. AMBROSINI
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Section 14 (c)—State
Court Jurisdiction over Labor Dispute.—Stryjewski v. Local 830,
Brewery & Beer Distrib. Drivers.'—Plaintiff beer distributor is a Pennsyl-
vania business concern composed of husband and wife. Under existing business
conditions, plaintiff purchased its supply of beer from an "importing distrib-
utor," who imported beer from outside the state. A Teamsters Union affiliate,
which had a collective-bargaining contract with some importing distributors,
picketed the plaintiff's premises. The purposes of the picketing, according to
the union, were to advertise the fact that plaintiff was nonunion and to at-
tempt to organize plaintiff's employees. Because employees of the importing
distributors would not cross the picket line to make deliveries to the plaintiff,
the picketing precluded all shipments of beer supplies from those distributors.
Plaintiff did not, initially, seek relief from the National Labor Relations Board.
Instead, it brought suit in the local court of common pleas against the union
seeking damages and asking for injunctive relief to restrain the picketing. After
a hearing, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction on the ground
that the matters at issue were arguably within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB.2
Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Central to the
controversy was Section 14(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 3 This
1 426 Pa. 512, 233 A.2d 264 (1967).
2 Id. at 515, 233 A.2d at 266.
3 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1964). This section states:
(c) (1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by pub-
lished rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to
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